NEOPOPULISM AND THE NEW AGRICULTURE by Runge, C. Ford
Ot
CHI~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~December 1986
Neopopulism and the New Agriculture
C. Ford Runge
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs
University of Minnesota
Staff papers are published without formal review within  the Department
of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
The University of Minnesota is  committed  to  the policy that  all persons
shall have equal access  to its programs, facilities,  and employment
without regard  to  race,  religion, color, sex,  national origin, handicap,
age,  or veteran status.Neopopulism and the New Agriculture
Just prior to the November elections, an organization called the  "New
Populist Forum" announced itself under the banner of "Saving the
Heartland."  What was unusual about the group,  in the preelection season,
was not that it sought  to politicize the  farm issue. What was unusual,
given its populist identity and avowed purpose, was that  the New Populist
Forum arose from the traditional spittoon of populist rhetoric:  Washington
itself.  One of its founders,  Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa,  (together with
Congressman Lane  Evans and Texas agriculture commissioner Jim Hightower)
has  for several years promoted a plan in Congress  to raise the  level of
farm price  supports  and to  impose mandatory controls  on production.  The
"Harkin Plan,"  as  it has become known, is  the major Neopopulist
alternative  to  current farm policy.
Without  irony, the September, 1986  announcement declared itself "a
Washington  - based organization dedicated to tipping the balance of power
toward average  citizens, changing the government policies in favor of
common sense and common men and women, and securing economic opportunities
for all."  It went on to  say that  it was  "rooted in the economic  ideas of
100 years  ago,"  and "works with the Congressional  Populist Caucus,"  as
well as  "local progressive populist officeholders,"  "grass roots
activists,"  and  "organizers around the country whose vision it  shares."
Because my own roots are in  the Progressive Party of Wisconsin - a
close cousin to Populism - I began to  reflect on the meaning of
Neopopulism for  the  future of American agriculture.  What relevance do
populist ideas have  for today's farmer?  How is  the  farmer's situation
similar  to that of 100 years  ago,  and how  is  it  different?  Because my
2research as  an agricultural economist is  on renewing American agricultural
competitiveness  in an international context, I wondered:  what does
Neopopulism say to the New Agriculture?
Populism and Neopopulism
Populism is  a mutable concept.  From the agrarian populism of late  19th
century America  to  the narodniki  of revolutionary Russia, no single
unifying set  of ideas can be found.  Contradictions abound. In her 1981
Populism, Margaret Canovan writes  that  "intellectuals, peasants of various
types,  and commercial farmers characteristically have produced different
kinds  of populism, intelligibly related to  their  social and economic
situations but not reducible  to  a common core."
An illustration of one contradiction in American agricultural  populism
is  ambivalence toward government, captured in the  tension between a
"Washington  based" New Populist Forum dedicated to  "grass roots
interests."  This  ambivalence also  characterizes  the Harkin Plan, which
calls  on farmers  to hold referenda on mandatory production controls for
their commodities.  A wheat  farmer would vote  on the  issue  for wheat, and
a corn farmer  for corn.  If a majority vote yes,  then production would be
controlled at  a level sufficient  to  force prices  to  70 percent of parity,
about twice  current world market levels.  Like  raising a column of water,
prices would be  driven to  these  target levels by narrowing the base of the
column.  On the one hand, direct democracy is preserved by referendum;  on
the other hand, mandatory controls become a form of Orwellian dictat, what
one liberal critic  (writing in the New Republic) called the  "wheat
police."
3An additional tension is  that populist programs in agriculture
invariably call  for extensive government  intervention in  the economy on
behalf of people who already own large amounts of property.  As Canovan
writes,
In terms of ordinary Right-Left distinctions  this  seems  confusing, for
it has often been assumed that the natural allies of state intervention
will be  those who possess no property and have nothing to lose.
Commercial  farmers, however, insofar as  they are dependent upon market
forces over which they have no more control than they have over the
weather, tend to welcome a good deal of government protection, in spite  of
their determination to  remain autonomous on their own land.  The situation
of the modern European small  farmer, protected from the risks of
agricultural production by the umbrella of the European Community's Common
Agricultural Policy, is  typical of this development  (p.104 ).
Despite these and other political contradictions, American farm
populism can be largely explained in terms  of three key social and
economic forces.  These  are  (1) instability arising from international
markets;  (2) deflationary price movements; and (3) financial stress.  In
this respect, strong parallels unite  the populism of yesterday and today.
Instability  in International Markets
In its  current form Neopopulism is closely tied to  the larger debate
over protectionism and America's slipping export position in  international
markets.  The Harkin Bill, like  the European Common Agricultural Policy,
is  essentially an inward-looking program for agriculture,  in which the
primary objective  of mandatory controls is  to  force up agricultural prices
for domestic consumption while insulating domestic production from
international competition.  Requiring over 135 million acres,  at current
estimates,  to be retired from production, it would attempt to  seal off
American farm prices from the vagaries of world markets.  This insulation
is  in reaction to  increases in farm price  instability resulting from the
4agricultural trading system.  The U.S. benefited enormously from this
system in  the  1970's  as  its export markets grew, but it has suffered from
the  abrupt reversal  in exports  since  1980-81.  This  decline  is  largely
attributable  to previously high U.S.  price supports and the strong dollar.
This inward-looking view of American agriculture  is consistent with
earlier forms  of populism,  which historians have characterized as
isolationist  and at  times  even xenophobic.  In the  last part of the 19th
century,  American farmers were utterly dependent on railroads  that shipped
grain from newly opened lands  to market.  Often financed by outside
capital,  the railroads became natural  targets of those who  feared that
"foreign interests"  sought to manipulate and control the  farmer.  In a
sectional  sense, the Midwest and South found in a populism a true
difference with the outward-looking, trade-dependent Eastern Seaboard.  To
the East dwelled, as  one populist phrase had it,  "the plutocrats,  the
aristocrats  and all  the other  rats."  This  isolationist attitude, which
the historian Richard Hofstadter has called the "paranoid style"  in
American politics,  contains a strong flavor of "America-first".  In
agriculture,  it  is  fed today by the gnawing suspicion that America is  no
longer  first, and  is  slipping further behind in the international
competitive race.
Deflationary Price Movements
Today's  farm economy is  experiencing severe declines  in crop, land and
farm equipment prices.  Current world grain supplies  are so huge,  and so
far  in excess  of demand,' that  chronic deflationary pressures are projected
by many analysts  to continue into  the  indefinite  future.  In reaction, the
Harkin Plan calls  for commodity price - fixing to hold crop prices well
5above world levels.  Since administered prices at these  levels will
encourage additional production and yield increases both at home and
abroad, it  is  likely that more and more acreage will need to be retired
over time  if domestic prices  are to be supported.
In the  face of deflationary commodities price movements, many have
argued that more inflation would be a good thing.  Inflation is  the friend
of the  debt and land holder, and American farmers hold plenty of both.
This view also has  its  roots  in the populism of 100 years ago.  Then, the
debate  revolved around silver coinage,  immortalized in William Jennings
Bryant's  famous  "Cross of Gold" speech. From 1792  to  1873 the United
States was on a bimetallic standard, with both gold and silver dollars
legal tender.  In 1873, with silver scarce and the majority of nations
adopting a gold standard, silver was demonetized at the behest of trade-
oriented interests, mostly in the East.  Silverites,  joined by advocates
of paper currency  (Greenbackers) decried the  "Crime of 73"  as  a conspiracy
hatched by a cabal of English, Jewish and Wall  Street bankers.  "Free
silver" was  the cry of the  indebted, based on the view that agriculture
was especially victimized by a currency fixed only to gold.
This line of argument proved especially popular in  the silver mining
states of the West.  But its real appeal lay  in the agrarian sector, where
falling crop and land prices made  an inflationary monetary policy highly
attractive.  William Harvey's  1894 pamphlet, Coin's  Financial School,
employed young "Professor Coin" as  the imaginary protagonist of a united
silverite policy.  Silver, according  to the professor, "was so much
handled by the people and preferred by them, that  it  was called the
people's money.  Gold was considered the money of the rich."
6Interestingly, monetary recovery ultimately came not from increased silver
coinage, but from increased gold production in the  last years of the  19th
and first years of the  20th century.
Today's Neopopulism retains an implicit bias  in favor of monetary
expansion and inflation,  though without  its bimetallic edge.  Its  appeal
is  the  same.  In October, 1986, an index of Minnesota corn prices  fell  to
its lowest level in over a decade.  Land price declines have been even
more  dramatic, as  the accompanying chart shows.  Perhaps  as significant as
the nominal decline shown in the  chart is  the real,  inflation - adjusted
drop,  suggesting that even after accounting for  inflation, recent
downward price adjustments are historically unprecedented.
Financial  Stress  in Agriculture
International market forces  together with deflationary commodities
prices are joined by a third force explaining financial stress  in
agriculture.  To  falling exports and crop and land prices must be added
the  fact that real interest costs on farm debt escalated with dizzying
speed from 1980  to  1985, and have moderated only slightly since.  The
reason these costs rose  in real  terms was primarily deflation.
Monetary policies  to  control  inflation proved successful enough to
switch farm borrowing from a paying proposition for many in the 1970's  to
a financial disaster in the  1980's.  In 1979,  borrowing costs were
actually negative after accounting for inflation, and American farmers
took on ever larger amounts  of debt.  But as  inflation fell  (along with
crop and land prices)  many farmers who had borrowed to  expand their
operation to meet export demand that never materialized were  left hanging.
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above those  in the non-farm sector.  The height of this  spread in rates
coincided, in 1985, with the most strident calls for a moratorium on farm
foreclosures  as a way of "stopping the clock" together with general
attacks on bankers and lending  institutions.
In this sense,  international markets, deflation, and financial  stress
are  three dimensions  of a vice which has squeezed value, capital,  and
people out of an overheated agriculture.  Farm foreclosures, resulting
calls for debt moratoria, and anti-banker sentiment are  the visible
effects of these  complex forces.
In the  late  19th century, agriculture did not overheat due  to a short-
lived export bonanza.  Rather, a domestic land boom, stimulated by Western
settlement, proved the  culprit.  Then, as today, settlers on homesteads  in
the West needed capital for machinery, fencing and seed, and they
mortgaged their land to  get  it.  This was encouraged by banks  and
railroads.  In Beatrice,  Nebraska, a real estate firm's  slogan read:
Beatrice is not dead or dying,
Real estate  is  simply flying,
He who buys  today is wise,
For Beatrice dirt  is  on the rise.
When the  crash in  land values  came,  large numbers of farmers  (including my
own ancestors, who had left Wisconsin to homestead in the Dakotas) walked
away from mortgaged land poorer but wiser.  To  farmers  in such financial
stress,  the silverite argument as well  as calls  for debt moratoria and the
notion of a  "bankers' conspiracy"  took on added appeal.  Return to  the
gold standard appealed because farm debt became worth more to  creditors
9with each passing year.  Moratoria were argued then, as now, as  a way to
stop  the clock and to  "punish" banking interests.
These historical parallels help explain the current appeal of
Neopopulism in American agriculture, which is  indeed rooted in ideas  of
100 years  ago.  As a reaction to economic and social forces,  Neopopulism
is  understandable.  But is  it a realistic basis for policy, or will it
sink, like  its precursor a century ago,  in a sea of political and economic
contradictions?
The New Agriculture
America today is  a trading nation.  When trade surpluses become trade
deficits,  jobs are  lost and Americans  (and their elected representatives)
react.  Yet  in the  last  25 years, America's overall trade balance has been
supported by hefty surpluses  in agriculture, stimulated by productivity
increases greater  than in any other sector of the American economy of
comparable size.  On balance, agriculture has gained far more  from trade
than it  has lost.  Its  defining feature, as economist Vernon Ruttan notes,
is  that  "it  is  one of our largest remaining world class  industries."
Although America is  a trading nation, and agriculture has been one of
our major trade success stories, it  is not an agricultural nation in the
sense that it was  a century ago.  While  statistics on the  small number of
farmers in relation to  the population (44% in  1880, 2.7%  in  1980) are
often cited, less obvious  is  the  fact that the standard of living enjoyed
by American farmers results largely from purchased products  from outside
of agriculture, and the-ability  to sell crops  into a complex set of
marketing channels which move this produce  around the world.  It  is  the
integration of the U.S.  agricultural system with international markets,
10and with products and processing channels beyond the farm gate, that makes
American farmers competitive  in the  international marketplace.
In addition to this  international and off-farm integration, American
farmers are increasingly linked to the  financial sector.  Financial  and
commodities market linkages  put individual farmers  in a symbiotic  (if
uneasy) relationship with their  lenders as  never before.  On a more global
scale, the capacity of Third World countries  (the  largest growth market
for U.S.  farm exports) to  repay financial obligations  to  international
lenders makes  farm exports and hence  farm prices a direct function of the
international cost of borrowing.
Trade, marketing, and financial integration are  all  features of what
might be called the  "New Agriculture" of the late  20th Century.
Unfortunately, it does  not appear that the plan offered by the
Neopopulists  fits well into  this world.  It  is,  rather, a reactionary
attempt to turn back the clock.  Its  lack of fit, curiously, occurs in
each category that gives it  impetus.
First, and most obvious,  is  the conflict between increasingly open
international trade  in agriculture and the  inward-looking agenda
represented by the Harkin Plan.  The  gains  from trade  for  agriculture  and
the American economy as a whole have been large, and have supported an
agricultural sector which would be much smaller  in the absence of these
export markets.  Despite  large declines  in U.S. farm exports over the  last
five years, more  than half of the corn, wheat and soybeans produced in  the
Upper Midwest continue to  flow into the international market.  To  shut
down production in order  to keep domestic prices high  is,  in effect, to
surrender  these markets  to  American competition in Argentina, Brazil, and
11the European Community.  Profit-maximizing processors and purchasers  of
grains both here and abroad would rapidly  turn to  these other  sources.
For  this reason, the Harkin Plan  is accompanied by provisions  for export
subsidies which would make up the difference between domestic and world
prices.  These subsidies, besides  triggering retaliation, would be very
expensive on a volume basis unless the  amount exported was  small.
Moreover, it is  doubtful  that  the Harkin Plan could succeed over  the long
run in raising domestic prices  through production controls, which will be
frustrated by yield-improving  technology.
In recent research, I have studied the important statistical linkages
from farm exports  to farm income,  and from farm income  to land values.
Over the years  1949  to 1984,  the most  important factors affecting farm
income have been interest costs, government payments, and farm exports.
When the sources of land value decline were analyzed statistically, farm
income was  the most important predictor of these  declines, while
government payments were much less  important.  I interpret these results
to mean that international  trade  is  a key element supporting farm income,
and that increased government payments  alone are  incapable of supporting
this  income or  (indirectly)  land prices.  If policies  are implemented that
reduce U.S. agricultural exports, we can expect continued increases in our
overall  trade deficit,  and continuing downward pressure  on farmland
values.
A second conflict between Neopopulism and the New Agriculture arises
from an inflationary agenda  in a deflationary period.  In response,
domestic price-fixing by the government  or renewed inflation are  simply
inadequate.  While problems of farm debt, driven by continued interest
12cost burdens, make understandable a desire for renewed inflation, there
are better ways  to deal with the farm credit crisis  than an attempt to
float all boats on an inflationary froth.  As noted above,  farmers  are
increasingly dependent on purchased inputs of seed, fertilizer, equipment
and consumer goods. Combined with massive crop surpluses and large
quantities of land in excess supply,  inflation will not have an equal
effect on prices paid and prices  received by farmers.  Many farm costs
(including interest costs)  are  likely to rise with inflation before crop
prices  or land values  do, placing additional burdens  on the farm economy
at an especially  inopportune time.
Just as higher prices purchased through production controls  are
unlikely to provide a long term substitute  for growth in world demand, so
inflation is  unlikely to stimulate recovery without real underlying growth
in farm productivity and programs targeted specifically at  reductions in
financial  stress.
The third and final malady afflicting the Neopopulist program is  its
hostility to the  financial sector on which agriculture increasingly
depends.  It  took the financial acumen of Felix Rohatyn to  save New York
from fiscal involvency.  A  similar level of financial sophistication will
be necessary to  deal with the  farm financial crisis,  which has both
domestic  and international dimensions.  Attempts to  stop  the clock  through
farm  (or international) debt moratoria will punish the bankers, all right,
who will  in turn punish farm and other borrowers by rationing and raising
the cost of credit.  This form of self-abuse, ironically, provides a
short-run organizing base  for populist claims, since  it would
unquestionably make  financial conditions  in agriculture worse.
13In both domestic and international  credit markets,  debt rescheduling is
urgently called for.  This rescheduling will  require cooperation between
farmers, farm lenders,  and the  financial community.  In Minnesota and
other  states, programs have helped reduce farm interest burdens  in return
for bank commitments to  share  the costs.  Similar programs  are possible at
the national and even the  international level,  if the mutual interests of
the parties can overcome recrimination and blame-laying.
In the  final analysis, Neopopulism lacks the  coherence necessary to
provide a meaningful policy alternative.  Perhaps, as Oxford's Isaiah
Berlin put  it,  populism has a "Cinderella complex."  In his own attempt to
define  it,  Berlin wrote that  "there exists a shoe  - the word populism  -
for which somewhere  there exists a foot."  But Berlin was not so  sure.
"There are  all kinds  of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be
trapped by these nearly fitting feet."  If Neopopulism is  indeed the old
shoe  I have described, then it fits  the feet  of the modern farmer and
modern American political life uncomfortably, if at all.
14